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J The 1987-1988 Term of the United States Supreme In Greenwood the Court held that the inspection of 
trash was not a "search" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. The warrantless search of trash left 
on the curb would be protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment only if the defendant manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his garbage that society accept-
ed as objectively reasonable. According to the Court, 
Greenwood's subjective expectations were not deter-
minative because society was not prepared to accept 
that expectation as reasonable. 
Court ended in June. This is the first of two articles 
reviewing the major decisions involving criminal proce-
dure decided this Term. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Expectation of Privacy 
California v. Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. 1625 (1988), 
involved the search of a narcotic suspect's trash. After 
receiving a tip and observing suspicious activity at 
Greenwood's house, the police requested the regular 
trash collector to pick up and turn over Greenwood's 
garbage. A search revealed items indicative of narcotics 
use. Based on this information, a warrant was issued, ~ and cocaine and hashish were discovered in Green-
wood's house. The California courts suppressed the 
evidence because the warrantless search of the trash 
was not based on probable cause. 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The 
threshold question that must be asked when analyzing 
search and seizure issues is whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applies. If the Amendment is not applicable, neither 
probable cause nor a search warrant is required. In a 
series of cases the Court has held the Amendment 
applicable only to certain governmental activities, that is, 
those activities that intrude upon a citizen's justifiable 
expectations of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). Searches of homes, offices, cars, and 
containers are covered by the Fourth Amendment, as is 
electronic surveillance. In contrast, the police use of 
informants, beepers, or pen registers is not protected by 
the Amendment. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 
(1971); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Similarly, searches of 
jail cells, open fields, and bank records also fall outside 
Fourth Amendment protection. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 
(1984); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In all 
these situations, the Court has found no justifiable 
expectation of privacy. 
Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their 
garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim 
to Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowl-
edge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the Side of a 
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public 
... Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the 
curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third 
party, the trash collector, who might himself have sort-
ed through respondent's trash or permitted others, 
such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having 
deposited their garbage "in an area particularly suited 
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, 
public consumption, for the express purpose of having 
strangers take it," ... respondents could have had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory 
items that they discarded. 108 S.Ct. at 1628-29. 
Stop and Frisk 
Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S.Ct. 1975 (1988), raised 
the issue of whether an investigatory pursuit by the 
police constituted a seizure of the person within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Four policemen in a 
marked car were on a routine patrol when they observed 
Chesternut and another man. As soon as Chesternut 
saw the police, he began to run. The officers followed 
and soon caught up to him. As they drove alongside of 
Chesternut, he began to discard a number of packets. 
One officer got out of the car and examined the packets, 
finding pills which he believed contained cocaine. 
Chesternut was arrested, taken to the station house, and 
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searched. Additional drugs and a hypodermic needle 
were"discovered;-Ghesternut moved to suppress the 
evidence, and his motion was granted based on prior 
state precedents, which had held that an investigatory 
pursuit was a seizure under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), and flight alone did not amount to reasonable 
suspicion. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Chesternut argued 
that all police chases were seizures. In contrast, the 
State argued that a seizure did not occur until the sus-
pect stopped, and thus chases were never seizures. The 
Court rejected both contentions, adopting instead a 
middle ground. In Terry the Court wrote: "Obviously, not 
all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens 
involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by 
means of physicalforce or show of authority, has in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude 
that a 'seizure' has occurred." /d. at 19 n.16. Later the 
Court adopted Justice Stewart's definition of a seizure. 
Under this test, a person is seized "only if, in view of all of 
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason-
able person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980). 
Applying this test to the facts, the Court found no 
seizure. The police did not activate a siren, command 
Chesternut to stop, or display weapons. Neither did they 
use tt\e car to block his path or control his direction or 
speed. According to the Court, "[w]hile the very pres-
ence of a police car driving parallel to a running pedestri-
an could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of police 
presence does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure." 
108 S.Ct. at 1980. The brief acceleration to catch up with 
C!:!esterllJ.Ilimc;IJheshort drive alongside were not so 
intimidating that a reasonable person would believe they 
could not go about their business. Thus, since there was 
no seizure; there was no need to justify the pursuit with 
reasonable suspicion. 
Independent Source 
The defendants in Murray v. United States, 43 Crim. L. 
Rptr. 3168 (1988), were placed under surveillance for 
suspected drug violations. They were followed to a ware-
house in South Boston. After they had left the warehouse, 
the police entered without a warrant, viewing numerous 
burlap-wrapped bales that were later found to contain 
marijuana. The police left without disturbing the bales, 
k13pt thewgreJwus~ under surveillance, and applied for a 
search warrant. In applying for the warrant the police did 
not mention their prior entry and did not rely on any 
observations made during that entry. When the warrant 
was issued, the police immediately reentered the ware-
house and seized 270 bales of marijuana. 
On review, the Supreme Court ruled that the search 
could have been based on an untainted "independent 
source." The independent source rule was first recog-
nized by Justice Holmes soon after the exclusionary rule 
was applied to federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Justice Holmes wrote: 
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition 
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the 
Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this 
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does not mean that the facts thus obtained become 
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is 
gained from an independent source they may be 
proved like any others. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
The rule was applied to Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
violations (e.g., confessions and lineups) in later cases. 
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218,240-42 (1967).1n a recent case, the 
Court explained the rule as follows: 
[T)he interest of society in deterring unlawful police 
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive 
all pro~Citi_v_e~ EIY_idEmce of a crime are properly balanced 
by puttmgtfie:pollcein the same, not a worse, position 
that they would have been in if no police error or mis-
conduct had occurred ... When the challenged 
evidence has an independent source, exclusion of 
such evidence would put the police in a worse position 
than they would have been in absent any error or viola-
tion. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). 
The Court believed that the independent source rule 
may be applicable in Murray. According to the Court, the 
ultimate question was "whether the search pursuant to 
warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of 
the information and tangible evidence at issue here." 43 
Crim. L. Rptr. at 3170-71. Therewouldbe no independent 
source if the decision to seek the warrant was prompted 
by what the police had seen during the illegal entry, or if 
information obtained during that entry was used to estab-
lish the probable cause necessary for the warrant. The 
Court remanded OR this issue, so that the District Court 
could make further findings. In particular, whether "the 
agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earli-
er entered the warehouse." /d. 
CONFESSIONS 
Miranda 
The defendant in Arizona v. Roberson, 43 Crim. L. 
Rptr. 3085 (1985), was arrested at the scene of a burglary. 
Advised of his Miranda rights, he requested counsel. 
Three days later, while still in custody, a different police 
officer questioned him about a different burglary. This 
officer was unaware of the fact that Roberson had 
requested an attorney at the time of his arrest. Miranda 
warnings were again read and an incriminating state-
ment was obtained. 
On review, the Supreme Court found a Miranda viola-
tion. The prosecution argued that Michigan v. Mosley, 
423 U.S. 96 (1975), controlled. In Mosley the defendant 
asserted his right to remain silent but did not request 
counseL He was later questioned by a different police 
officer about a different crime. This interrogation led to a 
confession. The Court upheld the admissibility of the 
confession, finding that the police had "scrupulously 
honored" the defendant's decision to remain silent: 
"[T]he police here immediately ceased the interrogation, 
resumed questioning only after the passage of a signifi-
cant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of 
warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a 
crime that had not been the subject of the earlier interro-
gation." /d. at 105-06. The Court, however, had estab-
lished a different rule when a suspect claims the right to 
counsel. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S 477 (1981), the 
Court wrote: 
[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to 
further interrogation by the authorities until counsel 
has been made available to him, unless the accused 
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police. /d. at 484-85 (emphasis 
added). 
The Court ruled that the Edwards "initiation" rule 
applied. In the Court's view, the fact that a different crime 
was involved in the second interrogation did not matter. 
The compulsion remained the same and was not dissi-
pated by a second set of warnings, especially after pro-
longed police custody. Moreover, the factthat the second 
officer was unaware of Robeson's initial request for coun-
sel was irrelevant. That officer was obliged to determine 
whether a demand for an attorney had been made: "The 
police department's failure to honor that request cannot 
be justified by the lack of diligence of a particular officer." 
43 Grim. L. Rptr. at 3088. 
Right to Counsel 
Patterson v. Illinois, 43 Grim. L. Rptr. 3146 (1988), 
involved a confession and the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. Patterson was arrested for his participation in a 
gang fight, which he admitted after receiving Miranda 
warnings. He was also suspected of a murder that oc-
curred after the gang fight, but he denied any knowledge 
of this incident. He was subsequently indicted for the 
murder. While being transferred to a different jail, he 
voluntarily made some incriminating statements. He was 
promptly advised of his Miranda rights and confessed. 
The Supreme Court ruled that Patterson's right to 
counsel had not been violated. The Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel differs from the Miranda rights, which are 
based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and also includes a right to counsel. The 
Sixth Amendment is triggered by the commencement of 
judicial adversary proceedings. Here, the indictment trig-
gered Patterson's right to counsel. Patterson argued that 
the indictment placed him in the same position as a pre-
indictment suspect who, while being interrogated, 
asserts the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Under 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), such a suspect 
may not be questioned again unless he initiates the 
meeting with the police. The Court rejected this argu-
ment. The essence of Edwards is the preservation of 
"the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with 
the police only through counsel." Because Patterson never 
requested counsel, this policy was never implicated. 
Patterson's second argument concerned the validity of 
his decision to waive his right to counsel and speak to the 
police. In particular, whether the Miranda warnings, 
which are directed to Fifth Amendment rights, also 
provide sufficient notice for the waiver of Sixth Amend-
ment rights. The Court held that, in this context at least, 
the warnings are sufficient. The Miranda warnings in-
formed Patterson of his right to consult an attorney and 
the consequences if he spoke without an attorney. 
According to the Court, there was little else to tell him 
about the right to counsel. 
As a general matter, then, an accused who is 
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admonished with the warnings prescribed by this 
Court in Miranda . .. has been sufficiently apprised of 
the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the 
consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his 
waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and 
intelligent one. We feel that our conclusion in .a recent 
Fifth Amendment case is equally apposite here: 
"Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to 
rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times 
knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and 
that he was aware of the State's intention to use his 
statement to secure a conviction, the analysis is com-
plete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law." /d. at 
3149 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23 
(1986)). 
Accordingly, the Court rejected the notion that a Sixth 
Amendment waiver was "more demanding" than a Fifth 
Amendment waiver, a position that had been advocated 
by some commentators and adopted by a number of 
courts. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Counsel of Choice 
The defendant in Wheat v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 
1692 (1988), along with numerous codefendants, was 
charged with a far-flung drug distribution conspiracy. Two 
of the codefendants, Gomez-Barajas and Bravo, were 
represented by the same attorney, Eugene lredale. Bravo 
pleaded guilty to one count of transporting marijuana, 
and Gomez-Barajas offered to plead guilty to tax evasion 
and illegal importation. At this point in the proceedings 
lredale informed the trial court that Wheat wanted lredale 
to represent him. The prosecution objected to the substi-
tution of lredale as counsel on the ground that his 
representation of Gomez-Barajas and Bravo created a 
serious conflict of interest. There was a possibility that 
Bravo would be called as a prosecution witness at 
Wheat's trial, in which case lredale might not be able to 
cross-examine him in a meaningful way. Despite this 
conflict, Gomez-Barajas, Bravo, and Wheat were willing 
to waive their right to conflict-free counsel. The trial 
court, however, refused to permit the substitution. Wheat 
went to trial with his original lawyer, was convicted, and 
appealed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the trial court's deci-
sion. The Court first pointed out the qualified nature of 
the right to choose one's own counsel. For example, an 
accused may not chose as an advocate a person who is 
not a member of the bar. Similarly, an accused cannot 
insist on an attorney that he cannot afford. Here, the 
issue was the extent to which a criminal defendant's right 
under the Sixth Amendment to his chosen attorney is 
qualified by the fact that the attorney has represented 
other defendants charged in the same conspiracy. In 
prior cases the Court had held that multiple representa-
tion may raise a conflict of interest and thus violate the 
right to effective assistance of counsel: 
Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect 
because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from 
doing ... [A) conflict may ... prevent an attorney from 
challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to 
one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from 
arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative involve-
mentandculpability of his clients in order to minimize 
the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another. 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978). 
A defendant's waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel 
would not automatically cure the problem. The federal 
courts have an independent interest in ensuring that 
trials are conducted in conformance with ethical stan-
dards and just verdicts are rendered. Moreover, a trial 
court must make its decision before all the evidence is 
introduced at trial. This fact makes the decision more 
difficult. In many cases even the attorneys will find it diffi-
cult to predict how the trial will develop; a "few bits of 
unforeseen testimony or a single previously unknown or 
unnoticed document may significantly shift the relation-
ship between multiple defendants." /d. at 1699. 
Accordingly, trial courts must be allowed "substantial 
latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only 
in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be 
demonstrated before trial, but in the more common 
cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or 
may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial 
progresses." /d. In this case, the motion for substitution 
was made two days before trial in a complex conspiracy 
case with each defendant playing different roles. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court's refusal to permit 
substitution of counsel was not an abuse of discretion. 
Appointed Counsel - Frivolous Appeals 
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 
S.Ct. 1895 (1988), concerned the scope of court-appoint-
ed appellate counsel's responsibility to an indigent client. 
In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Court 
helattiatappellate counsel could not withdraw from an 
appeal by simply advising the appellate court of his con-
clusion that the appeal was frivolous. Instead, counsel 
must include with the request to withdraw "a brief 
referring to anything in the records that might arguably 
support the appeal." /d. at 744. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court adopted a rule that imposed an additional require-
ment in this context. The brief must also include "a dis-
cussion of why the issue lacks merit." McCoy, an 
indigent, was convicted of abduction and sexual assault. 
He challenged the "discussion" requirement as violative 
of Anders and the Sixth Amendment. 
On review, the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the discussion rule. Initially, the Court reviewed 
the difference between counsel's obligations at trial and 
appeal. At trial, the defendant is presumed innocent. It is 
proper for counsel to remain silent and require the prose-
cution to carry its burden of proof. Once convicted, how-
ever, the presumption of innocence no longer applies 
and counsel must assert specific grounds for reversal. 
This requirement carries with it ethical obligations. 
Neither paid nor appointed counsel may deliberately 
mislead the court with respect to either the facts or the 
law, or consume the time and the energies of the court 
or the opposing party by advancing frivolous argu-
ments. An attorney, whether appointed or paid, is 
therefore under an ethical obligation to refuse to 
prosecute a frivolous appeal. 108 S.Ct. at 1900. 
If counsel determines the appeal would be frivolous, he 
must inform his client that it would be unethical to go 
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forward with the appeal. This is true whether counsel is 
retained or appointed. Appointed counsel, however, 
cannot withdraw without permission of the court. This 
presents a dilemma, creating an apparent conflict be-
tween counsel's obligation to the court and his obligation 
to his client. Anders attempted to resolve this dilemma. 
An Anders brief "was designed to provide the appel-
late courts with a basis for determining whether appoint-
ed counsel have fully performed their duty to support 
t~eir clients' appeals to the best of their ability." /d. at 
1902. It also provides the court with a basis for determin-
ing whether counsel's judgment about the merits of an 
appeal is correct. The Wisconsin "discussion" rule re-
quires counsel to explain why the appeal lacks merit by, 
for example, summarizing case or statutory authority 
which support counsel's conclusions. As the Court 
noted, the rule does go beyond Anders. "Instead of rely-
ing on an unexplained assumption that the attorney has 
discovered law or facts that completely refute the argu-
ments identified in the brief, the Wisconsin court requires 
additional evidence of counsel's diligence." /d. at 1904. 
According to the Court, this is consistent with Anders anc\ 
may in fact aid the client. The rule provides "an addition-
al safeguard against mistaken conclusions by counsel 
that the strongest arguments he or she can find are 
frivolous." /d. 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
Face-to-face Accusation 
The defendant in Coy v. Iowa, 56 Law Week 4931 
(1988), was charged with sexually assaulting two 13-year 
old girls. At trial the prosecution moved to have the girls 
testify either via closed-circuit television or behind a 
screen. Both procedures were authorized by statute. The 
trial court opted to.use a large screen. Coy objected, 
asserting his right of confrontation. The Iowa courts 
rejected this claim. 
When the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court, it 
reversed. The Court first reviewed its prior cases. In an 
early case, Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), the 
Court had written: "[A] fact which can be primarily estab-
lished only by witnesses cannot be proved against an 
accused ... except by witnesses who confront him at 
trial, upon whom he can look while being tried ... "/d. at 
55. Similarly, in a recent case, the Court observed: "The 
Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections 
for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those 
who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 
(1987). 
Next, the Court found that face-to-face confrontation 
was essential to fairness and the integrity of the fact-
finding process. "It is always more difficult to tell a lie 
about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' In the 
former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told 
less convincingly." 56 Law Week at 4933. In the Court's 
view, the importance of this right outweighed its draw-
backs. 
[F]ace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the 
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same 
token it may cor.found and undo the false accuser, or 
reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a 
truism that constitutional protections have costs. /d. 
The Court aeclined to determine whether an exception 
to face-to-face confrontation could be justified. The State 
argued that the statute created a presumption of trauma 
for child abuse victims. The record in this case, however, 
did not support such a finding. "Since there have been 
no individualized findings that these particular witnesses 
needed special protection, the judgment here could not 
be sustained by any conceivable exception." /d. at 4934. 
The Court then sent the case back to the state courts to 
consider the harmless error rule. 
Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority opinion, 
also wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice White 
joined. Their votes were necessary for a majority. She 
wrote: 
I agree with the Court that appellant's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause were violated in this case. I write 
separately only to note my view that those rights are 
not absolute but rather may give way in an appropriate 
case to other competing interests so as to permit the 
use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a 
child witness from the trauma of courtroom testimony./d. 
She specifically referred to state statutes that authorized 
closed circuit television and video-taped testimony. Thus, 
"if a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity," 
the compelling state interest of protecting the child could 
outweigh the defendant's right. 
Hearsay 
United States v. Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838 (1988), involved 
a confrontation-hearsay issue. John Foster, a correctional 
counselor, was assaulted in a federal prison. He suffered 
a fractured skull, which resulted in an impaired memory. 
While hospitalized, he identified Owens as his attacker 
and picked his picture from an array of photographs. At 
trial, Foster testified about the attack, including his iden-
tification of Owens while in the hospital. On cross-exam-
ination, however, he admitted that he could not remember 
seeing his assailant. Foster also admitted that he could 
not remember any of the numerous visitors who he saw 
in the hospital, except tor the F.B.I. agent who interviewed 
him. He could not remember whether any of these visi-
tors suggested Owens as the attacker. The defense 
attempted to refresh his recollection with hospital 
records, including one in which he attributed the assault 
to a third party. Owens was convicted and appealed on 
hearsay and confrontation grounds. 
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The 
Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause did not 
bar testimony concerning a prior out-of-court identifica-
tion when the identifying witness is unable, because of 
memory loss, to explain the basis for the identification. 
According to the Court, the Clause guarantees only an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination. This right is 
satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity to bring 
out such matters as a bad memory. 
The weapons available to impugn the witness's state-
ment when memory loss is asserted will of course not 
always achieve success, but successful cross-examin-
ation is not the constitutional guarantee. They are, 
however, realistic weapons, as demonstrated by 
defense counsel's summation in this very case, which 
emphasized Foster's memory loss and argued that his 
5 
identification of respondent was the result of the 
suggestions of people who visited him in the hospital. 
/d. at 843. 
The Court also considered a hearsay objection. Feder-
al Evidence Rule 801(d}(1}(C) excludes from the hearsay 
rule a prior statement "of identification of a person made 
after perceiving the person," if the declarant "testifies at 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement." The Court ruled that the 
requirements of this provision had been satisfied; the 
witness had been subjected to cross-examination 
"concerning the statement." He was placed on the stand, 
took the oath, and responded willingly to questions. His 
loss of memory did not preclude cross-examination on 
the statement. 
Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations 
on the scope of examination ... may undermine the 
process to such a degree that meaningful cross-
examination within the intent of the rule no longer 
exists. But that effect is not produced by the witness's 
assertion of memory loss- which, as discussed earli-
er, is often the very result sought to be produced by 
cross-examination, and can be effective in destroying 
the force of the prior statement. Rule 801(d)(1)(C), 
which specifies that the cross-examination need only 
"concer[n] the statement," does not on its face require 
more. /d. at 844. 
(Ohio Evidence Rule 801(D)(1)(c} is identical to the feder-
al rule except for the addition of one word). 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Comment Upon Failure to Testify 
The defendant in United States v. Robinson, 108 S.Ct. 
864 (1988}, was convicted of mail fraud. The prosecution 
introduced a number of out-of-court statements made to 
the police by Robinson, who did not testify. In closing 
argument Robinson's counsel tried to minimize the prior 
statements by suggesting that his client had not been 
given the opportunity to explain his actions. In response, 
the prosecutor told the jury: "He could have taken the 
stand and explained it to you ... " 
The Sixth Circuit ruled that this comment violated the 
Fifth Amendment, citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 
(1965). In Griffin the Court wrote: · 
[Comment on the refusal to testi!y) is a penalty 
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privi-
lege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt 
for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the 
accused's knowledge is in any event natural and 
irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not 
magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a 
constitutional privilege. What the jury may infer, given 
no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer 
when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused 
into evidence against him is quite another. /d. at 614. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment 
"forbids either comment by the prosecution on the 
accused's silence or instructions by the court that such 
silence is evidence of guilt." /d. at 615. 
The Court in Robinson, however, distinguished Griffin. 
It is one thing to use the Fifth Amendment as a shield; it 
is ~l:!itl3canother thing to use it as a sword: -
Where the prosecutor on his own initiative asks the 
jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's 
silence, Griffin holds that the privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination is violated. But where as in this 
case the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's 
opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made 
by defendant or his counsel, we think there is no viola-
tion of the privilege. /d. at 869. 
Corporate Records 
Braswell v. United States, 43 Crim. L. Rptr. 3103 (1988), 
involved the Fifth Amendment in the corporate context. 
Braswell controlled two corporations. State law required 
three directors. His wife and mother were the other direc-
tors but did not exercise any authority over the business 
affairs of the corporations. In August 1986 a federal 
grand jury issued a subpoena to Braswell, in his capacity 
as president, for the books and records of both corpora-
tions. Baswell moved to quash the subpoena, arguing 
that the actofproducing the records would incriminate 
him in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
and thereby resolved an issue that had divided the lower 
courts. Baswell's situation fell between two lines of 
cases. One line of cases had recognized that the act of 
producing documents in response to a subpoena may 
trigger Fifth Amendment protection: 
The act of producing evidence in response to a 
subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of 
its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers 
produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly 
.. conced.esJhe existence of the papers demanded and 
their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also 
would indicatethe taxpayer's belief that the papers are 
those described in the subpoena. Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). 
Later, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the 
Court considered a claim by a sole proprietor that the 
6 
compelled production of business records violated the 
Fifth-Amendment. The Court upheld the claim, accepting 
the lower court's finding that by producing the records, 
Doe would admit that the records existed, were in his 
possession, and were authentic. Baswell argued that as 
sole shareholder he was in the same position and that 
Doe controlled. 
A second line of cases, however, thwarted his claim. 
These cases recognized the "collective entity rule." In an 
early case, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court 
had held that a corporation was not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment. Subsequently, the Court held that the 
custodian of corporate records could not assert the privi-
lege iilresp-or'fsEHOasi.ibpoena, even if those records 
incriminated him. Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 
(1911); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The 
rationale of these cases was extended to labor unions in 
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), and to a 
small partnership in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 
(1974). In effect, a person who holds the records of a 
collective entity in a representative capacity cannot 
assert his own privilege to preclude production. The 
Court held that this line of authority controlled: "A custo-
dian may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on 
Fifth Amendment grounds." 43 Crim. L. Rptr. at 3106. 
Underlying the. Court's decision was a concern for 
white-collar crime prosecutions: 
[R]ecognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf 
of the records custodians of collective entities would 
have a detrimental impact on the Government's efforts 
to prosecute "white-collar crime," one of the most seri-
ous problems confronting law enforcement authorities. 
"The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an 
organization or its representative is usually found in 
the official records and documents of that organiza-
tion .. Were tbecJoakofthe privilege to be thrown 
around these impersonal records and documents, 
effective enforcement of many federal and state laws 
would be impossible:' /d. at 3107 (quoting United 
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944)). 
